glut. While they concede that the glut has less to do with market mechanisms and more to do with policy initiatives of foreign governments, they do not believe that the trade deficit reflects inadequate economic policies within the United States.
Ben S. Bernanke (2005) is one of those who locate the principal cause of the U.S. current account deficit abroad.
Recently, as chairman of the Federal Reserve, Bernanke has offered a number of compelling reasons for the downward pressure on long-term yields (2006, pp. 3-5) . Among them, he cites a stable inflation outlook, increased currency market intervention by foreign governments, and a decrease in the supply of long-duration securities.
While accepting that foreign government policies are largely responsible for the current global imbalances, Federal
Reserve officials also believe that it will be markets rather than government policy that will benignly unwind these imbalances, with little effect on the U.S. economy. Federal Reserve Governor Donald L. Kohn (2005) , speaking at The Levy Economics Institute last year, remarked: "In all likelihood, adjustments toward reduced imbalances in the United States and globally will be handled well by markets without, by themselves, disrupting the good, overall performance of the U.S. liabilities. We find that temporary policy measures have masked the future costs of servicing foreign-owned U.S. debt.
Views vary as to whether the growth in the current account deficit presages trouble for the U.S. economy. Our colleague Wynne Godley has been warning of the dangers inherent in running trade deficits for some time. Godley points out that the growing external debt of the United States matters for the same reason a growing debt matters to any entity: a growing debt generates a growing debt service burden (1995, p. 11) . He warns that the outflow from servicing the foreign debt acts as a "kind of hemorrhage from the circular flow of national income" (p. 13).
In Levy Institute Policy Notes and Strategic Analyses that date back many years, Godley has stressed that the longer these deficits persist, the more difficult the eventual correction will be. Until recently, the debate over the current account balance focused primarily on whether the impending adjustment would be benign or potentially damaging to the U.S. and world economies. Nobody was questioning whether or not an adjustment to the U.S current account balance was forthcoming (Altig 2005) . Richard Hausmann and Frederico Sturzenegger (2005) , at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, have taken a far-out position and suggested that no such adjustment is imminent. They argue that all accounting systems are arbitrary, and contend that assets and liabilities have been systematically mismeasured: measurement error has created "dark matter" that will keep global financial markets from running into a crisis. They suggest that accounting conventions are inadequate and propose to measure assets by the income they generate (p. 9). Because the United States received a net income of $30 billion on its financial portfolio, they contend that it is a net creditor.
In this Strategic Analysis, we show that net income out- The cost of funding U.S. credit market debt has also declined considerably in the last five years. To estimate the cost of funding debt, we use U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data and take the annual flow of interest divided by the average stock of debt (over a two-year period) measured at current costs. In the mid 1980s, the funding costs of debt were around 8 percent. These costs hovered near 6 percent from the mid 1990s to 2000, but from 2000 to 2004, they dropped considerably. This is shown in Figure 5 . The separation of the two lines shows that the funding cost for the United States relative to that of foreigners rose modestly. In 2004, the funding cost was around 3.02 percent for the United States, and a little over 2.59 percent for foreign credit market assets in the United States.
As a result of the growing U. Because the bulk of foreign-owned securities are credit market assets, the current account deficit is becoming more sensitive to changes in interest rates. Maturity lengths should stabilize as the benefit offered by funding with low short-term interest rates disappears.
Other financial entities, such as banks and hedge funds, also often look to fund a good deal of their long-term assets with short-term liabilities. Although prudent banking requires that long-term assets be funded with long-term liabilities, the financial incentives of expanding the net interest margin by funding long-term debt with commercial paper are enticing. Table 1 States should rise more rapidly than in the past.
Our econometrics shows that an increase in the federal funds rate will affect the ex-post return on U.S. assets held abroad slowly. We found that an increase of 100 basis points implies an 
Scenarios
Our scenario analysis is based on the same premises we used to make the projections in our September 2005 Strategic Analysis.
At that time, we used information from the first half of 2005, and noted that if output in the United States grew sufficiently to keep unemployment constant, the deficit in the current account would likely worsen. We projected that the current account deficit would reach 7.5 percent of GDP by the end of the decade. Our projection was conditional on the assumption that the private sector's net financial balance, which was negative 2.6 percent of GDP in the second quarter of 2005, would slowly move back to zero over the next five years through a deceleration in the growth rate of household borrowing. We projected that this would eventually flatten household debt relative to income, which was at the time at historic highs.
Since the external sector's contribution to aggregate demand was negative, a slowdown in private sector borrowing and expenditure implied that government spending would be required to fuel growth. We estimated that the general government deficit would also reach 8. This increase contributed to the deterioration of the current account balance, which fell to negative 6.9 percent of GDP by year-end. If we look at the current account balance components in Figure 9 , we see that, excluding oil imports, the deficit has leveled off with respect to GDP. At the end of 2005, the U.S. economy continued to grow on an unbalanced path. It follows that new projections using the same assumptions as in our previous analysis will show worse outcomes, since the starting points-for both the external deficit and private sector debt-are higher than six months ago. We have repeated our exercise, again assuming that private sector borrowing-and household borrowing in particularslowly declines and brings the private sector back to balance by the end of the decade. This implies that household debt will level off at about 102 percent of GDP. We expect nonfinancial business debt to stabilize at 68 percent of GDP. We also assume no devaluation of the dollar and no further increase in the relative price of oil. We assume a moderate increase in the federal funds rate of about 130 basis points in the next year. Our estimates show that this will lead to a moderate increase in interest rates paid on U.S. assets held abroad, which will contribute to the worsening of the current account balance. In contrast to the CBO projections, private sector borrowing and domestic demand have been rising rapidly. The most recent GDP release from the BEA shows that while disposable personal income has increased by only 3.8 percent, consumption expenditure has increased by 5.5 percent. Fixed investment, both residential and nonresidential, is also apparently booming. Since domestic demand is growing more rapidly than income, it must be the case that private sector borrowing is still increasing. We have therefore updated our estimates for an alternative growth path, one in which the government deficit is now assumed to follow the projections in the last CBO report. We simulate our model to calculate the amount of borrowing from the private sector necessary to finance domestic demand, so that GDP growth follows the path projected by the CBO. The results for the main sector balances are reported in Figure 11 . In this scenario, the government sector slowly moves back to balance, but the increase in borrowing will continue to push the private sector into the red, with net acquisition of financial assets reaching an all-time-high deficit of about 7 percent of GDP and the debt-to-income ratio for the personal sector growing exponentially as a ratio to GDP.
Although this scenario may seem more likely in the short run, it will steadily increase the risk of default for the U.S. private and financial sectors.
Conclusion
In this Strategic Analysis, we have examined the views of U.S. obtained only through a further relaxation of fiscal policy.
Accordingly, we project that the combined government deficit will have to reach a record 9 percent of GDP by 2010. Our projections are shown in Figure 10 . We also project that the current account balance will have to grow to 9.8 percent of GDP by 2010 for the CBO projections to hold-a much larger figure than the one we estimated six months ago. We do not believe this scenario to be a likely outcome.
Percent of GDP to extend the maturity of its newly issued securities, as old debt is refinanced at higher rates, and as foreign central bankers limit and diversify their treasury reserves-the burden of servicing U.S. debt owned by foreigners will begin to manifest in an even greater deterioration in the current account balance.
